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Executive summary
This report from the Policy Institute at King’s was 
commissioned by the BBC Trust in October 2015 in 
order to better understand how the BBC’s financial 
independence can be enhanced, particularly in light of 
the manner in which financial settlements were agreed 
in 2010 and 2015.
Through a series of ten interviews with individuals 
who had experience of previous Charter Renewal and 
licence fee negotiations, or who were familiar with 
the process of financial settlement in other areas of the 
public sector, the Policy Institute identified five issues 
that had a bearing on the BBC’s financial independence, 
and eight possible ways to address them. The author 
supplemented the interviews with information drawn 
from publicly available sources. The report was 
completed in December 2015.
Five issues were considered – through the interviews 
and supplementary research – to have a particular 
bearing on the BBC’s financial independence:
1. Use of the licence fee beyond the public purposes of 
the BBC. 
2. Ad hoc process of settlement, without Parliamentary 
oversight.
3. Limited independent measures of BBC success in 
achieving outcomes.
4. Lack of public involvement or consultation.
5. Limited written commitment to BBC financial 
independence.
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The eight ideas that emerged through interviews that 
may help to address these five issues were:
1. Greater ring-fencing of the license fee, for 
example, by:
A. Further separating licence fee funding from central 
government accounts such that it is more clearly 
distinguished and is therefore less liable to be used for 
other purposes (such as payment of licence fees for 
over-75s).
B. Independent economic regulation of the BBC, as 
with the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) or Ofwat, 
such that an independent regulator has responsibility 
for assessing the affordability, value and budgetary 
needs of the BBC. 
2. Formalising the process of licence fee settlement, 
for example through:
A. Agreeing a fixed year cycle for funding settlements, 
as for Network Rail (5 years), the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR) (4 years) or the Pharmaceutical 
Price Regulation Scheme (5 years). 
B. Introduce a BBC Charter Renewal (Procedure) 
Act 2015 for the process of Charter and licence fee 
renewal, as proposed by Lord Birt and Lord Inglewood 
in the House of Lords in July 2015. Or set out a process 
for licence fee settlement within the Charter itself.
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3. Enhancing accountability to provide greater 
confidence in BBC financial probity, for example by:
A. Strengthening links between funding and annual 
outcomes using an approach closer to Channel 4 as 
regards to meeting clearly set outcomes that are then 
catalogued in a published annual report.
B. Enabling independent scrutiny by encouraging 
the development of an independent body capable of 
scrutinizing the BBC/public service broadcasting 
– similar to the oversight role of the OBR with the 
economy or the independent analysis done by the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies.
4. Increasing public participation, for example by:
A. Obliging public justification for the settlement 
by the BBC, or by the government, to show how 
the settlement will benefit the licence fee payer (as 
proposed in the 2011 Culture, Media and Sport Select 
Committee report). This may include the structural 
integration of the public to licence fee renewal and 
settlement.
5. Contractual commitment, such as:
A. Agreeing a Memorandum of Understanding 
regarding independence, with respect to finance, 
between the BBC and the government (see, for 
example, the OBR’s Memorandum of Understanding 
with Treasury, Department for Work and Pensions and 
HM Revenue and Customs). 
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The ideas suggested by interviewees and outlined 
in this report are not alternatives to one another. They 
could, for example, be deployed in combination as 
they address different issues. They are not intended 
as recommendations, but as ideas that may merit 
further assessment if they are found to be of interest in 
addressing the BBC Trust’s concerns. 
Certain ideas are more straightforward to implement 
than others, but may have less impact. The illustrative 
chart below plots the ease with which each idea may 
be implemented against the impact each might have. 
The chart is purely indicative and is not based on data.
Options: Potential Impact and Ease of Implementation (Illustrative)
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Introduction
This study was commissioned by the BBC Trust in 
October 2015 and published in January 2016.
The BBC Trust asked the Policy Institute at 
King’s to explore ways in which the BBC’s financial 
independence might be better protected, particularly 
in light of the manner in which financial settlements 
were agreed in 2010 and 2015. 2010 was a ‘tough 
settlement’ made in ‘exceptional circumstances’ the 
then Chair and DG said. Of the 2015 settlement 
the Chair of the Trust said that though it would not 
oppose the changes made by the government it could 
not ‘endorse the process by which it [the funding 
agreement] has been reached’. The Trust was also 
‘disappointed that they [licence fee payers] have not 
been given any say in the major decisions about the 
BBC’s future funding’.
The BBC Trust was keen to explore possible ways 
in which to address these – and related – issues, and 
therefore better protect its financial independence 
in future. It commissioned the Policy Institute to 
write a short study, within a six-week time frame, 
identifying possible ways to do so. This is, therefore, 
an exploratory think piece, not a systematic review nor 
a comprehensive analysis.
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Methodology
The Institute and the BBC Trust agreed to identify 
ideas through a series of interviews with those who 
had been closely involved in previous Charter Renewal 
and licence fee negotiations, or who were familiar 
with the process of financial settlement in other 
areas of the public sector. A list of the interviewees is 
included in the Appendix. These interviews generated 
a conceptual framework for understanding the issues 
facing BBC financial independence. This framework in 
turn informed targeted research on potential ways in 
which to address those issues.
The ideas in the study emerged from the interviews, 
supplemented with information drawn from publicly 
available sources. The ideas are not mutually exclusive, 
nor are they meant as alternatives to one another. They 
are not intended as recommendations, but as ideas that 
may merit further assessment if they are found to be of 
interest in addressing the BBC Trust’s concerns.
Defining BBC independence
Independence, in the context of the BBC, is a highly 
contested term that has been explored extensively in 
academic literature, in contemporary political debate, 
and in the press, whether over the Corporation’s 
coverage of Northern Ireland during the Troubles, or 
the way in which it reports elections.
For the purposes of this study, the Policy 
Institute was asked to consider the issue of BBC 
financial independence, rather than constitutional 
independence more broadly, editorial independence, 
or independence of appointments. In this context 
financial independence is defined as the freedom of 
the BBC to make decisions as to how best to use its 
funding to fulfill its public purposes, as set out in the 
11
Royal Charter, supported by the licence fee.a Such 
freedom includes having the confidence to be able to 
make future spending commitments on the basis of 
predictable funding.
The report considers ways in which financial 
independence – as defined here – might be enhanced, 
in the context of ways it is felt to have been 
compromised in the past.
The purpose of BBC independence
According to research from the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport to inform the renewal of 
the previous BBC Royal Charter, the British public 
believe the BBC’s independence to be one of its most 
important assets:
‘We asked people what they particularly valued 
about the BBC, through quantitative surveys, 
qualitative research and wide consultation. There 
was very strong support for what respondents felt 
were two particularly distinctive characteristics: its 
independence and its lack of advertising’.1 
The public’s responses to other questions helped 
indicate why people believe independence to be such 
an important asset to the BBC. Eighty five per cent 
thought the BBC ‘has an important role in keeping the 
public well informed’, and 84 per cent claimed that 
they listened to, or watched, BBC news ‘every week.’1 
The BBC is also regarded internationally as a model 
for public service broadcasting, particularly with 
regard to its perceived independence from government:
a The BBC’s public purposes are set out in its Royal Charter (2006) Clause 4.
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‘The idea of public service broadcasting was 
born in Britain. Free from political and commercial 
interests, its main pillar is independence and the 
idea of putting citizens first...Changes to the system 
should serve to strengthen the independence of 
the broadcaster, not weaken it. This is especially 
important in the case of the UK, as the British 
model is often viewed as a model for how the media 
should be organised in new democracies.’2
There are, as stated above, very different views as 
to what constitutes independence for the BBC, and 
on the degree of independence it should enjoy, though 
on the basis of opinion research and given the level of 
debate it evokes, there appear to be few who believe it 
is not an important value of the BBC.
Assumptions and caveats
The study takes as its starting point a number of 
assumptions in order to focus the options for better 
protecting financial independence:
Continuation of funding via a licence fee
The BBC’s financial independence, and protection 
of it, will depend on the way in which the BBC is 
financed in future. The options presented in this report 
are predicated chiefly on a licence fee model.
Changes to BBC governance: the future
Financial independence of the BBC will be partly 
contingent on the future governance model. Some of 
the examples referenced in this report may not work 
with particular governance models.
13
Personalities and culture
Interviewees emphasised that structural safeguards for 
financial independence would only be as strong as the 
people who held them. Without individuals who are 
strongly committed to the financial independence of 
the BBC, further protections will not be effective.
About this study
The study concentrates on issues related to financial 
independence, as opposed to constitutional 
independence, editorial independence or independence 
of appointments. However, the study recognises that 
these aspects, while they may not have a direct bearing 
on the extent or manner of BBC financial settlements, 
do have an indirect effect, and vice versa.
The study has been peer reviewed by one reviewer 
from within the Policy Institute at King’s and one from 
a separate institution (listed in the Appendix).
14 
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Identifying the issues
Based on the interviews, there are five main issues 
associated with the current funding process that 
have a bearing on the BBC’s financial independence.
1. Use of the licence fee beyond the public purposes of 
the BBC
There is a concern, voiced by one or more interviewee, 
that the licence fee is increasingly being used for 
purposes beyond those set out in the Royal Charter. In 
2006 the BBC agreed, as part of its Charter renewal, 
to use the licence fee to help support digital switchover. 
At the time the government agreed it was ‘a new 
purpose, unique among all broadcasters’.3 In 2010 the 
BBC agreed to take responsibility for the majority of 
S4C, for supporting digital switchover and broadband; 
and for supporting the provision of local television, in 
addition to taking responsibility for the BBC World 
Service and BBC monitoring. In 2015 the BBC agreed 
to take responsibility for paying for the over-75s licence 
fee.
2. Ad hoc process of settlement, without Parliamentary 
oversight
The level of the licence fee is set by secondary 
legislation but the process by which a licence fee 
settlement is reached is, interviewees stated, ad hoc 
and lacks Parliamentary oversight. There is no set 
period, for example, for licence fee settlements. In the 
past there have been one year settlements (in the late 
1970s) and a seven year settlement (from 1999-2006).
16 
3. Limited independent measures of BBC success in 
achieving outcomes
According to some interviewees, there are limited 
independent measures that assess the extent to which 
the BBC succeeds in achieving its public purposes. 
Without such measures it is more difficult for the BBC, 
or for government, to establish whether the BBC is 
using its funds effectively and efficiently.
4. Lack of public involvement or consultation
The DCMS Select Committee, a number of Peers, and 
interviewees for this report, expressed disquiet that 
the public are currently excluded from participating in 
decisions regarding BBC funding and its effects. There 
is, for example, no obligation on the government or 
the BBC to consult the public regarding the financial 
settlement.
5. Limited written commitment to BBC financial 
independence
There is a concern, voiced by one or more interviewee, 
that the government’s commitment to BBC financial 
independence is not made explicit. The written 
commitment is chiefly limited to Clause 6 of the Royal 
Charter (2006) which refers to BBC independence ‘in 
all matters concerning the content of its output, the 
times and manner in which this is supplied’ but, with 
regards to finance, is limited only to independence ‘in 
the management of its affairs’.
17
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Advocates for reform
The negotiation of payment of the over-75s licence 
fee in July 2015 crystallised many of the concerns set 
out above, as reflected in the following extracts from 
the Lords debate on the Future of the BBC which 
immediately followed.
Lord Fowler (Conservative) criticised the 
unaccountability of the Charter Renewal process:
‘[T]he fact is that, at the end of the day the royal 
charter process means that they [the government] 
do not have to listen to anyone. They can draw up 
a new charter and agreement as they please; it does 
not go to Parliament or come under parliamentary 
scrutiny. Decisions rest with the government, and 
anyone who doubts that should look back to the last 
time’
Lord Fowler, House of Lords Debate, 14 July 2015
Lord Inglewood (Conservative) said the opaqueness 
of the process undermined confidence:
‘[T]his quasi-clandestine ritual [of Charter 
Renewal] to take place does no favours to either 
the Government or the BBC and does little to 
encourage confidence in the wider public, viewers 
or licence fee payers’.
Lord Inglewood, House of Lords Debate, 14 July 
2015
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‘We have just witnessed a smash-and-grab raid’ 
Lord Clement-Jones (Liberal Democrat) said of the 
negotiations regarding the licence fee in summer 2015. 
‘The deal that was done last week was appalling’ 
Lord Patten (Conservative and former Chairman of 
the BBC) said, ‘trying to turn the BBC into a branch 
office of the Department for Work and Pensions is 
completely ridiculous’.
Lord Birt (Crossbench and former Director General 
of the BBC) referred to the licence fee proposals of 
the government as ‘opportunistic, expedient and 
unprincipled diktats issued to the BBC in the dead 
of night, a pistol to its head, absent any democratic 
debate’.
Nor was there much confidence amongst Peers that, 
were the system not reformed, it would not happen 
again. Lord Lipsey (Labour) suggested that ‘Next 
time, I expect that the BBC will start paying for the 
NHS’. Lord Patten said he wished ‘I could feel a 
bit more confident about what is going to happen in 
future.’3
The Peers were not alone in raising serious concerns 
about the manner in which the licence fee negotiation 
was carried out. ‘As with the setting of the licence fee 
last week, the government seems to have forgotten 
some of the basic precepts of broadcasting policy – 
the etiquette of broadcaster independence’ the LSE’s 
Dr Damian Tambini wrote with reference to the 
government Green Paper.4 Labour MP Paul Farrelly 
called it a ‘drive-by shooting’, and the National Union 
of Journalists said the Chancellor was ‘raiding licence 
fee payers’ money to prop up his austerity budget’.5
21
Others were less critical of the process and argued 
that, as a publicly funded organisation, the BBC should 
not be exempted from the broader need to reduce 
public spending, just like other areas of the public 
sector. The Telegraph view was that:
‘The BBC is part of the public realm. It is owned 
by the nation and funded by the nation. That 
nation has made, and continues to make, financial 
sacrifices so that the British state lives within its 
means. So George Osborne, the Chancellor, is quite 
right to suggest that the BBC should play its part in 
balancing Britain’s books.’6
The Times did not comment on the manner of the 
settlement, but was sympathetic to a reduction in the 
BBC’s budget to limit the range of the Corporation. In 
a leader column the paper agreed with the Chancellor’s 
comment that the BBC risked becoming ‘imperial in 
its ambitions’ and suggested that George Osborne was 
‘right to raise the alarm’.7
The BBC Trust has sought to explore the concerns 
of those advocating reform partly by commissioning 
this study. Prior to setting out the potential approaches 
and options, the report puts BBC independence in brief 
historical context.
22 
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Brief historical context
While a detailed history of the BBC, its 
independence or its financing, are clearly beyond 
scope for this short report, it may be helpful to 
provide a brief overview of some of the relevant 
historical context.b
There have been eight Royal Charters in the history 
of the BBC, the first in 1927 and the current charter 
that was agreed in 2006.8 The first Charter specified 
that it ran for ten years, though there was less clarity as 
to the regularity of funding settlements:
‘14. The Corporation is hereby authorised and 
empowered:- to receive all funds which may be 
granted annually or otherwise by the Legislature in 
furtherance of the purposes of this our Charter’.
The BBC is given independence ‘in all matters 
concerning the content of its output, the times 
and manner in which this is supplied, and in the 
management of its affairs’.9 After the conclusion of the 
financial settlement in 2010 the Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport, Jeremy Hunt, wrote to the 
BBC Chairman Michael Lyons confirming its new 
b For the history of the BBC and debates around its independence see Asa Briggs’ 
five volume official history of broadcasting, The History of Broadcasting in the 
United Kingdom (Oxford: OUP), Jean Seaton’s Pinkoes and Traitors: the BBC and 
the Nation 1974-1987 (London: Profile Books), Alban Webb’s London Calling Britain, 
the BBC World Service and the Cold War (London: Bloomsbury Academic), articles 
such as Tony Shaw’s ‘Eden and the BBC During the 1956 Suez Crisis: A Myth Re-
examined’, Twentieth Century British History (1995) and many more.
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financial settlement and stating that:
‘This government will respect the BBC’s editorial 
and operational independence both as a matter of 
principle and as an obligation for the full duration of 
its Royal Charter to 31 December 2016’.10
However, according to the official histories of 
the BBC and other academic studies, the BBC’s 
independence has been challenged by government 
at numerous points in its history.c These challenges 
have variously been constitutional, political, technical 
and financial, though all of them – when they have 
been significant – have had editorial or operational 
repercussions.
In 1926 Winston Churchill, then Chancellor, 
wanted the government to take over the BBC during 
the General Strike. In the end it did not, since John 
Reith was able to convince the government that the 
broadcaster could help to resolve the crisis and that 
‘Since the BBC was a national institution and since the 
government was in this crisis acting for the people...the 
BBC was for the government in the crisis too’.11
Prior to the Second World War the government 
again considered taking over the BBC, this time due 
to its anxiety that enemy bombers would use BBC 
transmitters to locate targets. BBC engineers managed 
to devise a technical solution and avoid appropriation. 
The following year the BBC’s independence was 
questioned once again, as the government considered 
how much freedom the national broadcaster should 
enjoy during wartime. The government decided 
BBC independence to report was more valuable than 
government control.d
c For official histories see previous footnote.
d From interview with BBC official historian, November 2015.
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During the Suez crisis in 1956, the Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden ‘did everything possible to turn the 
BBC into his official mouthpiece’. Or as the BBC 
Director General Charles Curran said in 1972, during 
the crisis ‘the BBC had to face pressures stronger than 
any which had threatened its editorial independence in 
the 30 years since the General Strike’.12
Harold Wilson ‘threatened the BBC over its 
reporting of the 1965 Labour Party conference’, 
according to Sir Robin Day, and ‘both Margaret 
Thatcher and John Major, when Prime Minister, 
rattled their sabres when vexed by BBC editorial 
decisions’.13 From the late 1960s through to the 
conclusion of the peace process, Northern Ireland was 
a source of ongoing tension between the BBC and 
the government. Occasionally the tension was made 
explicit, for example in 1979 when the Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, told Parliament ‘it is time the BBC 
put its own house in order’.14
Following the Hutton Inquiry in 2004 and 
resignations of the BBC’s Director General and 
Chairman, the then Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell 
stressed the importance of a ‘strong BBC, independent 
of government’.15 The government Green Paper that 
followed was then titled ‘A strong BBC, independent of 
government’.1
Historically the licence fee has, many argue, been 
central to the BBC’s stability and standing. As the 
House of Lords Committee on Charter Review 
wrote in 2005, ‘the licence fee system has been vital 
to building the strong and world renowned BBC of 
today’.16
The BBC’s financial independence was most directly 
jeopardised during the late 1970s. As the official 
historian of the BBC, Jean Seaton, writes:
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‘In 1977, as the government dealt with the 
indignity of IMF cuts and industrial militancy, it 
imposed on the BBC the first of three hand-to-
mouth licence-fee settlements that were to last for 
one year only. No one called it grant-in-aid but in 
practice it was. Thus Labour came close to tying the 
BBC into general expenditure without a fig leaf to 
protect political independence’.17
At one point the Treasury even considered giving 
the BBC portions of its licence fee on the 15th of every 
month, ‘or small fractions weekly’. Instead, it decided 
on a one-year settlement. The BBC Governors lodged 
their dismay and documented the principle that ‘the 
licence fee should never be seen as part of annual 
expenditure’.17 Lengthier settlements, however, had to 
wait until after the next government took power.
Concerned about BBC inefficiency and keen 
to integrate market forces to the Corporation, the 
Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher set 
up the Peacock Committee in 1985. The Committee 
surprised the government of the day by rejecting 
the idea of advertiser funding for the BBC, and by 
concluding that the licence fee, with some alterations, 
should remain as the principal source of funding.18
The government followed the Committee’s 
recommendation, and in 1988 pegged the licence fee 
to inflation. Two years later the BBC began a decade 
of improving efficiency and introducing elements of 
market forces.19
By the time Gavyn Davies was asked to Chair an 
independent review of BBC funding in 1998 he was 
told, in his terms of reference, that the licence fee 
would remain the BBC’s main source of funding at 
least until Charter Renewal in 2006.20
27
Following seven years of above inflation increases 
in the licence fee the BBC offered, in 2006, to help 
support the move to digital switchover and to promote 
media literacy, as part of its new settlement. This was, 
as the government’s 2006 White Paper said at the time 
‘a new purpose, unique among all broadcasters. This is 
building Digital Britain’. It also created a precedent for 
the BBC taking on roles beyond its public purposes, as 
set out in its Royal Charter.3
The 2010 licence fee settlement
The Coalition government initiated discussion of the 
2010 licence fee settlement without prior warning on 
11 October 2010, even though the 2007 settlement 
had been agreed for a six year period, according to 
the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee’s 
2011 report.21 The Select Committee describes how 
the deal was then negotiated between the DCMS and 
senior figures at the BBC – in private – over the next 
ten days. It was then announced on Wednesday 20 
October.
As part of this deal, in addition to its existing 
programmes and services, the BBC was asked to take 
financial responsibility for the BBC World Service and 
BBC monitoring; for the majority of S4C (the Welsh-
language public service channel), for funding for digital 
switchover and broadband; and for funding to support 
the provision of local television.
The Select Committee noted the Director General’s 
comment that previous settlements had been 
negotiated over months, even years. This negotiation 
was, the Select Committee wrote, done in less than 
a fortnight, behind closed doors, and in the context 
of the closing stages of the Comprehensive Spending 
Review. 
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The Committee was particularly critical of the failure 
to involve licence fee payers, and the broadening of 
negotiation beyond the original proposal that the BBC 
pay for over-75s licence fee to include discussion of 
the whole settlement (as opposed to one aspect of it). 
This, they reported ‘weakened the distinction between 
the BBC and other publicly funded bodies’. As such 
it endangered ‘the singular status of the BBC as an 
autonomous public body, independent of government’. 
‘We recommend’ the report said, ‘that this model for 
setting the licence fee is not used again’.e
Mark Thompson, then Director General of the 
BBC, believed that the 2010 settlement, unsatisfactory 
though the process of negotiation was, protected 
the BBC from similar approaches in the future. 
‘[T]ransferring both the World Service and BBC 
Monitoring to licence fee funding’ Thompson told the 
Voice of the Listener and Viewer, ‘means that, after 
decades in which parts of the BBC have been in scope 
for government spending reviews, the BBC should 
never again have to get involved in a C[omprehensive] 
S[pending] R[eview]’.22 Yet, in July 2015, negotiations 
with the BBC over the licence fee were conducted in a 
similar manner to those in 2010.
The 2015 licence fee settlement
As yet, there has been no comparable attempt to 
describe the manner in which the 2015 BBC financial 
settlement was negotiated and agreed, similar to the 
description published by the Culture, Media, and 
Sport Select Committee report in 2011. However, the 
settlement was discussed in the House of Lords on 
Tuesday 14 July and was reported by newspapers at 
the time.
e See paragraph 26 of reference 21
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According to the debate and newspaper reports the 
2015 settlement was also initiated by the government, 
was conducted within a similar timeframe to the 
2010 settlement, and was similarly opaque. As a 
consequence of the negotiations the BBC agreed to 
take responsibility for payment of TV licences for the 
over-75s (phased in – with full responsibility from 
2020/21), and that the licence fee would rise in line 
with inflation over the next Charter Review period, 
subject to certain conditions.23 The payment of TV 
licences for the over-75s has been estimated to cost the 
BBC £650 million per year.24
Defending the settlement the Chancellor George 
Osborne said that ‘as a publicly funded body, it is right 
that [the BBC], like other parts of the public sector, 
should make savings’.25 Accepting the new financial 
obligation the Chair of the BBC Trust said ‘We accept 
this decision is a legitimate one for the government 
to take, although we cannot endorse the process by 
which it has been reached’.25
30 
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Potential approaches and options
Interviewees agreed that there is no magic bullet 
that would address all of the concerns listed 
above, particularly when the BBC is renegotiating 
its Charter and licence fee. Indeed, a number of 
the interviewees for this report emphasised the 
importance of BBC-government negotiation, given 
the nature of the BBC’s funding and purpose. 
However, there are ways in which one or more of the 
concerns may be addressed.
The ideas suggested by interviewees and outlined 
here are not alternatives to one another. They could, 
for example, be deployed in combination as they 
address different issues. The ideas are grouped into 
five different approaches and eight options, based on a 
conceptual framework generated by the interviews and 
by the degree to which they help address one of the 
five issues set out above.
The potential approaches and options proposed by 
interviewees are summarised here and then outlined in 
detail.
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Overview
1. Greater ring-fencing
To better protect the licence fee from being used 
for purposes beyond those set out in the BBC Royal 
Charter, and so that services funded by the licence fee 
remain under BBC control, the licence fee could be 
further ring-fenced by:
1A. Further separating licence fee funds
Greater separation of the licence fee from central 
government accounts such that it is more clearly 
distinguished and is therefore less liable to be used for 
other purposes (such as payment of licence fees for 
over-75s).
1B. Independent economic regulation of the BBC
As with the ORR or Ofwat, give responsibility for 
assessing the affordability, value and budgetary needs 
of the BBC to an independent regulator.
2. Formalise process
To address concerns about the ad hoc nature of the 
process of settlement, or to resolve anxieties about the 
lack of Parliamentary oversight, government could:
2A. Agree fixed year cycle for funding settlements 
Create fixed periods of funding, as for Network Rail 
(5 years), the OBR (4 years) and the Pharmaceutical 
Price Regulation Scheme (5 years).
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2B. Introduce a BBC Charter Renewal (Procedure) 
Act 2015
Legislate for the process of Charter and licence fee 
renewal, as proposed by Lord Birt and Lord Inglewood 
in the House of Lords in July 2015. Or set out a process 
for licence fee settlement within the Charter.
3. Enhance accountability
To address concerns about the limited independent 
measures of BBC success in achieving outcomes, one 
could seek to enable new methods of independent 
accountability. This could provide confidence in the 
government that the BBC is fulfilling its aims as set out 
in the Royal Charter and that strengthen the case for 
clear funding agreements by:
3A. Strengthening links between funding and 
annual outcomes
Develop a similar approach to Channel 4 as regards 
meeting clearly set outcomes as catalogued in a 
published annual report. In the case of Channel 4 these 
are set out in legislation. For the BBC they could be set 
out by the government in the Charter.
3B. Enabling independent scrutiny
Encourage the development of an independent body 
capable of scrutinizing the BBC/public service 
broadcasting – similar to the oversight role of the OBR 
in the economy or the independent analysis done by 
the IFS.
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4. Increase public participation
To address concerns about the lack of public 
involvement or consultation, the government and/or 
the BBC could:
A. Oblige public justification for settlement
Oblige the BBC or the government to show how 
the settlement will benefit the Licence payer, as 
proposed in the 2011 Culture, Media and Sport Select 
Committee report. For example, integrate the public 
more closely to Charter and licence fee renewal by 
reviving a version of the BBC National Broadcasting 
Councils (see later for explanation of Broadcasting 
Councils)
5. Contractual commitment
To address concerns about the limited written 
commitment to BBC financial independence, the 
government and the BBC could:
A. Agree a Memorandum of Understanding
Draw up a Memorandum of Understanding regarding 
independence, with respect to finance, between the 
BBC and the government (see, for example, the OBR’s 
Memorandum of Understanding with Treasury, 
Department for Work and Pensions and HM Revenue 
and Customs).
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Potential approaches and options in detail
Approach 1: Greater ring-fencing
A. Further separating licence fee funds - recover 
greater separation of the licence fee within central 
government accounts.
‘The BBC is increasingly referred to as though 
it were part of the public sector. It is not. It is an 
organisation financed not from the public purse but 
by those who use it. The fact that many of them are 
also taxpayers is no more relevant than the fact that 
those who pay their energy bills are also taxpayers’.
Bishop of Norwich, House of Lords Debate, 14 July 
2015, c526
In 2006 the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
reclassified the BBC for the purposes of aligning its 
definition with international accounting norms.26
The BBC, along with S4C, was reclassified to 
the central government sector, having previously 
been considered a Public Corporation (as Channel 
4 was and remains). At the same time the licence 
fee was reclassified in the National Accounts as a 
tax. ‘Previously,’ the ONS wrote, ‘this payment had 
been classified in the National Accounts as a service 
charge’. As a tax, the funds received from the licence 
fee would, from that point onwards, be counted within 
national accounts and the BBC’s assets and liabilities 
would appear as part of the government sector.
At the time, the ONS said, the ‘classifications are 
solely for the purpose of producing National Accounts 
and the statistical products based on them. This has no 
implication for the independence of these broadcasters.’
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It was the belief of a number those interviewed for 
this report, however, that this reclassification had a 
profound effect on the BBC, particularly with regards 
to financial settlements. From this point onwards, 
interviewees said, the government appeared to 
consider the funds derived from the licence fee in a 
similar manner to funds received from other forms of 
taxation, and to feel justified in using these funds for 
purposes beyond those of funding the BBC’s public 
purposes (as defined in the Royal Charter).
In 2010, for example, the government decided to 
use money from the licence fee to fund the majority of 
S4C, digital switchover and broadband, and support 
for local television, in addition to making the BBC 
financially responsible for the World Service and BBC 
monitoring. With the exception of the World Service 
and BBC Monitoring, the BBC does not have editorial 
or operational control over these other services. In 
2015 the government decided to use money from the 
licence fee to fund free licences for the over-75s   
(a policy introduced by the UK government in 2000).
The Culture, Media and Sport Committee also 
expressed concern in its 2011 report that the BBC has 
increasingly been seen as a government body:
‘A number of commentators have, however, 
pointed out that, by being drawn into the CSR 
process at all, the BBC risked being seen as little 
different to a Government Department or Agency’.
If the licence fee funds are not more clearly 
distinguished within national accounts and if they 
continue to be considered within the comprehensive 
spending reviews, there is no reason to believe that 
licence fee funds will not continue to be considered for 
purposes beyond those set out in the Royal Charter 
(such as over-75 licence fees, local TV, and broadband 
rollout).
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B. Independent economic regulation of the BBC
In order to further separate the government from the 
BBC executive, funding could be overseen by the 
regulatory body, as at Network Rail, or as at public 
utilities, such as water.
The ORR is the economic regulator for railway 
infrastructure (Network Rail and HS1), in addition 
to rail health and safety, and industry competition. It 
regulates Network Rail and, as part of this, does five-
year assessments of performance and funding:
‘At the heart of the review is our assessment of what 
Network Rail must achieve from 2014 to 2019, the 
money it needs to do so, and the incentives needed 
to encourage delivery and outperformance’27
These five-year periodic reviews include assessing 
the affordability of Network Rail and its value for 
money. This review - which includes public events 
and stakeholder consultation – can lead the ORR 
to conclude, after consideration, that Network Rail 
should be given a different amount than proposed. For 
example after the 2013 review:
‘Based on this analysis [of Network Rail’s Strategic 
Business Plan and proposed performance], and after 
listening carefully to what Network Rail and other 
stakeholders have told us, we’ve asked the company 
to run the network for £38 billion from 2014-19 – 
that’s £1.7 billion less than it originally proposed. 
We’ve listened when Network Rail has told us it 
needs more money – and where this has been proved 
to be justified, we’ve allocated extra funds.’28
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Organisations that provide public utilities work to 
a different model again. Ofwat, the Water Services 
Regulation Authority sets the limit on how much 
individual water companies can charge customers, 
and regulates standards of service. Once set, the 
water companies are obliged to provide water within 
that rate to customers, and to collect payment. The 
money collected by the water companies is under their 
independent control.29,30
The financial management of the BBC could be 
further removed from the political realm by building 
from the ORR-Network Rail model, or from the 
Ofwat model. A future independent regulator of the 
BBC could be an economic regulator like the ORR, 
in addition to its other duties. It could oversee the 
affordability of the BBC and its value for money, and 
evaluate its proposed budget on this basis. This could 
then mean that – following representations from the 
BBC and from government, and in consultation with 
representatives of licence fee payers - the independent 
regulator could be responsible for, or provide advice 
on, setting the level of the licence fee’ required to 
deliver BBC services (and the BBC’s consequent 
income), over a fixed period, with the level being 
approved by Parliament.
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Approach 2: Formalisation of process
A. Create fixed periods for funding settlements 
There has not, historically, been a fixed time period 
for licence fee settlements. In the late 1970s it was 
agreed on an annual basis. In 1999 the government 
agreed a seven year settlement. Such inconsistency can 
create instability and make planning more difficult, 
particularly if funding is short term or renegotiation 
comes unexpectedly.
Fixed periods for funding, falling outside central 
government spending reviews and, cyclically, shortly 
after each Charter renewal, could enable greater 
preparation and consultation, and enhance BBC 
independence. If, for example, Charter renewal were 
to take place every 11 years, each financial settlement 
could be for a six-year period.
Many institutions and services that involve 
significant public funds rely on fixed funding periods 
of four years and higher. This is to provide for stability, 
planning and independence.
Network Rail (5 Years) - Network Rail has ‘control 
periods’ for its funding. Each control period is five 
years:
‘We receive our government funding in five-year 
blocks called control periods. We are currently in 
Control Period 5 (2014 to 2019)’.31
The OBR (4 Years) - The OBR has a funding 
allocation for four years. Its ‘Delegation of Financial 
Responsibilities’ from the Permanent Secretary makes 
clear how important the lengthy fixed year funding is 
to its independence:
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‘Setting a multi-annual funding commitment 
supports the OBR’s independence and ability to 
manage its resources effectively in the medium term. 
This approach for financial institutions is consistent 
with international best practice, strengthening 
institutional independence through delegated 
budget autonomy’.32
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (5 Years)
The Department of Health’s Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation is a non-contractual voluntary scheme 
that ensures that the NHS can buy safe and effective 
drugs at an affordable price. Stable, predictable pricing 
within the scheme is crucial to the functioning of the 
NHS, and secures long-term steady income for the 
pharmaceutical companies:
‘It is a fundamental condition of the 
[Pharmaceutical Price Regulation] scheme that it 
will continue to operate for five years starting from 1 
January 2014.’33
B. A BBC Charter Renewal (Procedure) Act 2015
The process for renewing the BBC Charter and licence 
fee could be set in legislation in a ‘BBC Charter 
Renewal (Procedure) Act’ or equivalent.
During the debate on ‘The Future of the BBC’ in 
the House of Lords in July 2015 two Peers, Lord Birt 
(Crossbench) and Lord Inglewood (Conservative) 
proposed that there ought to be legislation that 
provides for a more transparent process of Charter and 
licence fee renewal. Lord Birt said:
41
‘It is plain that we now need a Magna Carta for 
the BBC itself. We need a framework, enshrined in 
statute and agreed by Parliament, which ensures 
that nothing like this can ever happen again; 
which sets out the proper roles of government, 
the BBC’s regulators and its executive; which 
outlines a considered, involving and transparent 
process for settling the level of the licence fee or for 
amending the BBC’s remit; and which enshrines 
the independence of an institution that is never, 
ever perfect, but which we should all safeguard and 
cherish’
Lord Birt, HL Deb, 14 July 2015
Following Lord Birt, Lord Inglewood said that:
‘My suggestion to the Minister, to echo the noble 
Lord, Lord Birt, is that the Government should 
put on the statute book a BBC charter renewal 
(procedure) Act 2015, which would set out a road 
map for this process and for future occasions’
Lord Inglewood, HL Deb, 14 July 2015
If the process of renewal and settlement was set out 
within legislation, or within the Charter itself, then it 
would not be possible to agree a licence fee settlement 
between the government and the BBC in a fortnight. 
The settlement would need to go through a structured 
process each time it was agreed, as well as being 
opened for public consultation.
Historically, a number of figures have raised concerns 
about the use of legislation to replace the Charter, or to 
provide for the Charter Renewal process. These have 
emphasised the opportunities that legislation could 
give for political involvement, and lobbying on behalf 
of special interests. As Lord Davies said in the Upper 
House in 2005:
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‘[An Act] would leave the BBC much more open 
to political intervention. Although noble Lords 
may argue that the legislation could be framed in 
such a way that it would obtain over a substantial 
period and that there would be no question of 
it being subject to change every year, it would 
be a brave Member at either end of the Palace 
of Westminster who would dare to foretell from 
where the challenges will come in the build-up of 
public pressure leading to the amendment of Acts of 
Parliament.’
Lord Davies, HL Deb, 9 December 2005, c922
There is not a direct analogy for legislating for the 
process of Charter renewal. However, state funding of 
the Royal Family provides a helpful comparison. The 
level and manner of State funding of the Royal Family 
is set out in the Sovereign Grant Act (2011). The Act 
sets out how to determine the amount of the Sovereign 
Grant, how this is reviewed, and how the level of the 
Sovereign Grant may be changed. The Royal Trustees, 
who review the level of the grant, are required to 
prepare a report of their review that they give to the 
Treasury and lay before Parliament.
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Approach 3: Enhance accountability
A. Strengthening links between funding and annual 
outcomes
Channel 4 is obligated, through its remit as set out in 
the Digital Economy Act (2010), to provide a range 
of programmes and services, and perform a series 
of duties.34 This stipulates a series of measurable 
outcomes that can be evaluated on a regular basis, in 
order to provide confidence that the public service 
broadcaster is meeting its objectives.
The BBC already has purposes within its Charter 
and service licences, but the BBC Charter could, like 
the remit for Channel 4, be clarified and strengthened 
on set outcomes, and report annually on the extent 
to which it has met those outcomes. This would, in 
the view of one interviewee, give the government 
more confidence in the governance and effectiveness 
of the BBC, and consequently allow it more financial 
independence.
In its annual report, Channel 4 sets out the extent 
to which it has succeeded in achieving the outcomes 
set out in its remit. In its ‘Statement of Media Content 
Policy’ it catalogues the ways in which it met the 
outcomes across all genres and services. These are in 
addition to ‘specific quantitative licence obligations, set 
and monitored by Ofcom, for news and current affairs, 
original production, regional production, subtitling and 
audiodescription services’.35
Channel 4 also commissions an ‘independent limited 
assurance report’ from an external auditor. In 2014 this 
was KPMG. Channel 4 employed KPMG ‘to provide 
limited assurance over their key measures.’
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The BBC could, an interviewee proposed, set 
outcomes such as:
• amount of BBC investment in original programming
• number of people trained by the BBC
• BBC investment in the creative industries
• number of BBC programmes exported
• provision of an independent, impartial news service 
(quantified).
If these (and other) outcomes were within the 
Charter and a regulator was responsible for holding 
the BBC to account over these then, it was suggested, 
it would be more difficult for governments to justify 
intervention.
According to the BBC Trust, the public also believe 
there is scope to make the BBC’s public purposes ‘more 
meaningful’ by making them ‘clearer and simpler’. 
‘The language of the [BBC’s public] purposes’ research 
by the BBC Trust found, ‘is not currently clear or 
straightforward for licence fee payers to understand’.36
A view was also expressed that such transparent 
annual outcomes could increase the susceptibility of 
the BBC to outside intervention and controversy over 
measurement, and therefore have the opposite effect to 
the one intended.
The objectives of the Bank of England are also set 
out in legislation, and the Bank is then left to achieve 
these objectives independently. The Chancellor sets 
the inflation targets and the Bank of England then 
has operational independence over monetary policy. 
The Bank’s independence was set out in the Bank of 
England Act (1998). The Act has since been amended 
but the Bank’s independence remains.
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In a comparable way, were the objectives of the 
BBC to be more clearly set out in the Charter then 
the BBC could potentially be given more operational 
independence to achieve those objectives.
B. Encouraging development of independent scrutiny 
of public broadcasting
There is currently little independent scrutiny of public 
service broadcasting and broadcasting policy, unlike 
in finance, where independent organisations like the 
IFS examine how public policies ‘affect individuals, 
families, businesses and the government’s finances’ 
(from IFS).37
There are also publicly funded bodies like the OBR 
that provide independent analysis of the UK’s public 
finances.38 There are similar bodies in other countries 
around the world including the Netherlands Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis, the German Council 
of Economic Experts, the Independent Authority 
for Fiscal Responsibility in Spain. Equally, there 
are independent organisations in other areas such as 
pensions, like the UK Pensions Policy Institute. Such 
independent scrutiny and analysis enables better 
informed financial decision making.
Interviewees pointed out that there is no similar 
independent or publicly funded body that scrutinises 
and analyses public service broadcasting generally 
or the BBC specifically. The only independent 
civil society organisation that currently monitors 
broadcasting is the Voice of the Listener and Viewer. 
It provides an opportunity for its members to question 
senior figures from broadcasting at its conferences and 
makes regular Parliamentary submissions. Its resources 
are, however, constrained and its focus is on quality, 
diversity and editorial integrity rather than the value 
and affordability of the BBC.
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As a consequence, it is more difficult for the public 
and Parliament to evaluate economic claims made by 
the BBC or by government. The BBC, for example, 
may claim it is efficient and value for money (and 
provide various metrics as evidence), the government 
may then claim the BBC is not efficient and is not 
value for money (and provide various metrics as 
evidence) and there is no independent third party with 
the status and expertise to evaluate the competing 
claims.
The IFS was established in 1969 with a view to 
creating ‘a kind of “shadow” Inland Revenue and 
Treasury’.39 An independent organisation, similar to 
the IFS but focused on broadcasting, could provide 
greater understanding of the economics of broadcast, 
and raise confidence in the financial rigour of public 
service broadcasters.
It is not clear where the genesis of this organisation, 
or its funding, would come from. Nor is it 
apparent how it should be constituted to ensure its 
independence. For this reason it is important to caveat 
the practicalities of this option.
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Approach 4: Increase public participation
A. Oblige public justification of settlement
‘The BBC and Government will need to 
demonstrate how this will benefit the licence fee 
payer’
CMS Select Committee Report, 2011
The BBC  or the government could be obliged to 
show how the settlement will benefit the Licence payer 
before concluding an agreement.
Consultation plays an integral part in the decision-
making process of most regulated industries. Ofcom 
has made public consultation an essential part of 
regulatory accountability.
‘Consultation is’ Ofcom states, ‘an essential part of 
regulatory accountability – the means by which those 
people and organisations affected by our decisions can 
judge what we do and why we do it’.40
The ORR builds public consultation into its 
review process. For Ofgem ‘Consultations are 
integral to the way we carry out our regulatory 
duties’.41 The National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) has a ‘Citizens Council’ of thirty 
representative members of the public.42 NHS England 
set up a national programme – ‘NHS Citizen’ - ‘to give 
the public a say on healthcare matters and influence 
NHS England decision making’.43
In 2011 the Culture, Media, Sport Select Committee 
said it believed that failure to properly involve 
licence fee payers in the 2010 settlement undermined 
confidence in the BBC, and recommended ‘that 
its [failure to involve licence fee payers] should not 
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become a model for the next round of licence fee 
negotiations for the post 2016/2017 period.’21
‘If the BBC is to continue to benefit from a universal 
licence fee then it is vitally important that both 
licence fee payers and Parliament should have some 
involvement when far reaching decisions about funding 
and the responsibilities are taken’ the Committee said.
It also stressed how differently the 2010 settlement 
was agreed to the way in which the public was 
consulted about financial proposals in Digital Britain:
‘the [2010] negotiation marked a notable 
departure from the manner in which the BBC Trust 
handled the previous government’s proposal (in 
the Digital Britain report) to allocate some of the 
licence fee to public service content on non-BBC 
services. Then Sir Michael Lyons wrote an open 
letter to licence fee payers, together with a rebuttal 
of the proposal to share the licence fee. He also 
commissioned research on licence payers’ views and 
preferences in relation to the proposals.’
There is precedent and pressure for the public to be 
formally included in any future licence fee agreements. 
In most regulated industries there are obligations 
on the regulator, and often the service providers, to 
engage in public consultation on issues that will have 
a substantive effect on the end user. The same could 
apply to financial settlements for the BBC.
The public could, for example, be more formally 
integrated into BBC governance and regulation 
through the revival of the Broadcasting Councils, or a 
version of them.
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Other regulated industries, such as utilities, have 
formal structures through which the public’s voice 
is represented. In 2005, for example, the Consumer 
Council for Water was established in order to 
represent water customers, based on the Water 
Act, section 35 (2003). The Council’s purpose is to 
make sure customers’ ‘interests are at the heart of 
decision–making in the water industry’.44 In addition 
to the Board of the Consumer Council there are 
‘local advocates’ representing the different regions 
of England and Wales. The Council states the local 
advocate committees ‘play a key role in ensuring the 
Council is aware of customers’ concerns including the 
interests of the disabled, chronically sick, pensioners, 
low-income and rural customers’.45
The BBC used to have National Broadcasting 
Councils for Scotland and Wales, and an Advisory 
Council for Northern Ireland. These were established 
in the 1952 Royal Charter following comments in the 
Beveridge report.46 The Councils were intended to 
provide a degree of independence to each of the UK 
nations, and to represent the interests of the people in 
that country.47 They were altered in the 1996 Royal 
Charter and then phased out entirely in 2006, replaced 
by Audience Councils that had a different remit and 
composition.48,49 The Audience Councils were more 
consultative and advisory than their predecessors and 
were not integrated to the regulatory process.
The Institute for Welsh Affairs (IWA) recently 
proposed reviving a version of the National 
Broadcasting Councils, though with greater executive 
power. The Councils, the IWA proposed, ‘should be 
replaced by National Broadcasting Trusts, operating 
under the umbrella of the BBC Trust, and responsible 
for the policy, content and allocation of resources 
for all services delivered solely for audiences in their 
respective countries’.50
50 
Councils, or updated versions of them, could - as 
with the Consumer Council for Water, include local 
advocates whose purpose would be to represent the 
concerns of members of the public in that area.
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Approach 5: Contractual commitment
A. Draw up a memorandum of understanding
A Memorandum of Understanding could be drawn 
up between the BBC and the DCMS – similar to that 
between the OBR and the Treasury/Department 
for Work and Pensions/HM Revenue and Customs 
– setting out the need for actual and perceived 
independence and what that means in practice.
The OBR is far smaller than the BBC, its role very 
different, and it is funded from the Treasury, but its 
particular constitutional position, and the nature of the 
government’s commitment to its independence, make 
it a helpful analogy with regard to the specific problem 
of the limited written commitment to BBC financial 
independence.
There is a Memorandum of Understanding between 
the OBR and the Treasury, the Department for Work 
and Pensions and HM Revenue and Customs. This 
emphasises the need for OBR independence:
‘The OBR must be independent and expert - and 
perceived as such - in order to provide credible fiscal 
and economic forecasts and scrutiny of the long 
term sustainability of the public finances’.51
The OBR retains complete discretion in determining 
its work programme and the timing of analysis, 
subject to its statutory responsibilities and available 
analytical resources. The OBR may choose to consult 
the Chancellor in preparing these reports, but is not 
obliged to do so.
The National Infrastructure Commission, announced 
by the Chancellor in autumn 2015, will also be an 
independent body whose independence is set out in 
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writing. In his letter to Lord Adonis, the Chancellor 
George Osborne wrote: ‘I intend to consult later this 
year on plans to put the Commission on a statutory 
footing and confirm its independence’ (30 October 
2015).52
There could be a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the BBC, the Treasury and the DCMS 
regarding financial independence, or the parameters 
of financial independence and the process of financial 
settlement could be set out within the Charter 
agreement.
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Greater ring 
fencing
Formalise 
process
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accountability
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public 
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Further separating licence fee funds
Independent economic regulation of the BBC
Agree fixed year cycle for funding settlements
Introduce a BBC Charter Renewal (procedure) Act 2015
Strengthening links between funding and annual outcomes
Enable independent scrutiny
Oblige public justification for settlement
Memorandum of understanding
Strengths and weaknesses of potential approaches and options
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Strengths: distinguishes BBC license fee funds in national accounts; enables more structured 
process for licence fee settlement
Weaknesses: reassessing ONS classification risks non-alignment with international accounting 
norms; other ways of distinguishing BBC funds not yet explored
Strengths: distances funding negotiations from the political realm, building off similar regulatory 
models like ORR or Ofwat
Weaknesses: BBC independence may be compromised by regulator rather than by central 
government
Strengths: allows for greater planning and consultation around licence fee settlement (compare 
with OBR, Network Rail and others)
Weaknesses: creates inflexibility to respond to economic circumstances
Strengths: creates a formal process with clear Parliamentary and public involvement
Weaknesses: could open the BBC and licence fee to political intervention
Strengths: measures BBC against clearer outcomes, providing rationale for budget decisions 
and giving greater confidence in its efficiency
Weaknesses: difficult to specify measurable outcomes, and may encourage intervention
Strengths: provides greater clarity regarding affordability and value for money of BBC, to both 
BBC and government 
Weaknesses: currently no originator and no funding. Not apparent how it should be constituted to 
ensure its independence 
Strengths: involves the public in the process of license fee settlement and makes rapid and 
opaque negotiations more difficult
Weaknesses: needs to sit within a structured settlement process and ensure public properly 
represented
Strengths: clarifies the nature and parameters of independence from government (compare 
with OBR) 
Weaknesses: not as strong as legislation and does not necessarily address issues regarding 
process of license fee settlement 55
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Appendix
Interviewees (in alphabetical order)
Professor Steven Barnett
Sir Peter Bazalgette
Lord Birt
Professor Diane Coyle
Nicholas Kroll
Lord O’Donnell
Lord Patten of Barnes
Professor Richard Sambrook
Professor Jean Seaton
Caroline Thomson
Analogs
Bank of England
Channel 4
Institute for Fiscal Studies
National Infrastructure Commission
Ofcom
Office of Road and Rail
Office for Budget Responsibility
Ofgem
OfWat
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Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme
Sovereign Grant
Independent Reviewers
Professor Jennifer Rubin (King’s College London)
Jill Rutter (Institute for Government) – the review was 
done independently and does not indicate endorsement 
of the conclusions by the Institute for Government
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